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This dissertation examines the influence of an organization’s reputation for stakeholder 
management on outcomes relevant to corporate executives.  I theorize that organizations develop 
two distinct reputations for stakeholder management. The first (for ease of exposition) is a 
reputation for “doing good.” "Do good" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by 
organizational actions that are perceived to generate positive spillovers. The second is a reputation 
for “avoiding harm.” "Avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by 
organizational actions that are perceived to reduce negative spillovers. I propose that stakeholder 
management reputation offers a lens through which board members may make sense of a corporate 
executive’s competencies. This sensemaking process triggers cognitive evaluation processes that 
influence the type of attributions made about the ability of corporate leaders. These attributions in 
turn inform the decisions that are made on their behalf.  The first study examines the effect of the 
reputation for stakeholder management on CEO dismissal. I propose that a reputation for "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management is more beneficial to alleviate the negative effects of poor financial 
performance on CEO dismissal. The second study examines the effect of the organization’s 
reputation for stakeholder management on CEO compensation. Here I propose that a reputation 
for "do good" stakeholder management holds a more positive association with CEO compensation 
relative to the reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management. I also examine the moderating 
role of firm performance, board independence and information uncertainty. I test these ideas on a 
sample of S&P-500 firms and the empirical analysis provides partial support for these ideas.     
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But I shall let the little that I have learnt to go forth into the day in order that someone better than 
I may guess the truth, and in their work may prove and rebuke my error. At this I shall rejoice that 
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A significant body of work on top management teams is concerned with understanding and 
explaining outcomes relevant to corporate executives. These outcomes include executive pay, 
executive selection and succession, executive decision-making and resource allocation amongst 
others (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2008). Although several phenomena have been found 
to be important predictors of the above outcomes, there is a relative lack of attention to the role of 
stakeholder management. This neglect is surprising on two levels. First, stakeholder management 
is considered a core aspect of a firm’s strategy, so I would expect that how a firm interacts with 
stakeholders could have meaningful consequences for corporate executives (Freeman, 1984; 
Hillman & Keim, 2001). Second, corporate executives are perceived to hold significant decision-
making authority in their organization’s management of stakeholders (Ormiston & Wong, 2013; 
Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016). Given these insights, the question naturally arises as to 
whether stakeholder management influences outcomes relevant to corporate executives.  
 While stakeholder management’s influence is the broad focus of this dissertation, the 
specific question this dissertation aims to address is, “What are the consequences of an 
organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on corporate executives?” Two 
considerations suggest the narrower specification of the broader research question may be more 
fruitful. First, the temporal distance between deployment of stakeholder management strategies 
and the realization of outcomes associated with these strategies suggests that estimating the 
effectiveness of stakeholder management is a difficult task (as attested by a large body of 
work(Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul, 2016)). Second, perceptions surrounding stakeholder 
management activities are likely to trigger sensemaking processes amongst decision makers that 
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can be consequential to managers (Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). The 
theoretical framework used in this dissertation conceptualizes stakeholder management reputation 
as a perceptual measure.     
Stakeholder management reputation is an integral part of corporate reputation (Fombrun, 
2005). Research suggests that senior executives play a key role in shaping stakeholder 
management reputation, both strategically as well as tactically (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 
1999; Schmit, Fegley, Esen, Schramm, & Tomassetti, 2012; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999). 
It is not surprising then that milestones related to stakeholder management are incorporated into 
incentive plans for executives (Hillman & Keim, 2001). Understandably when organizations 
violate stakeholder management expectations and suffer reputational damage, it is senior 
executives who are held responsible (Connelly, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2015). 
However, CEOs of organizations that hold strong reputations for effective stakeholder 
management stand to benefit (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). These findings are supported by 
substantial anecdotal evidence.  Consider the dismissal of CEOs at organizations such as JetBlue 
and Target (O’Connor, 2014; Tinsley, Dillon, & Madsen, 2011) whose organizations suffered 
reputational damage for poor stakeholder management, or the CEOs of PepsiCo and Apple 
receiving positive media coverage for their stakeholder management initiatives despite their 
shareholders’ negative perceptions regarding their organization’s financial or operational 
performance(Abboud, 2018, November 29; Colvin, 2013) . Despite this empirical and anecdotal 
evidence there isn’t much academic research that has examined when and why an organization’s 
reputation for stakeholder management would matter for executives. Moreover even less 
scholarship has embraced the complexity of stakeholder management as consisting of two separate 
sets of responsibilities – one aimed towards “doing good” and the other towards “avoiding harm” 
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(Brown & Treviño, 2006; Waldman & Galvin, 2008). This complexity is important because 
perceptions of stakeholder management and attributional processes that ensue may change based 
on goals that evaluators seek to achieve (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). For example, attributional 
processes surrounding CEO dismissal may not be the same as those adopted by boards prior to 
compensation decisions. Extant research adopts a monolithic characterization of stakeholder 
management reputation and theorizes that stakeholder management reputation amplifies the effects 
of other key variables, such as firm financial performance on both dismissal and compensation 
(Coombs & Gilley, 2005; Hubbard, Christensen, & Graffin, 2017). I propose that a more nuanced 
characterization of stakeholder management reputation may provide new insights into how 
stakeholder management reputation is consequential to organizational leaders.  
 Theoretically, the broader construct of reputation bears allegiance to two perspectives. An 
economics based perspective would suggest that reputation is closely linked to performance 
expectations. Understandably the focus is on financial and other tangible outcomes. This 
economics based perspective emphasizes historical performance (Washington & Zajac, 2005) and 
finds strong support in several studies of corporate reputation (Brown & Perry, 1994; Jensen & 
Roy, 2008). Organizations that fail to deliver on objective performance outcomes suffer 
reputational penalties alongside their leaders. The social institutional perspective is distinguished 
by its focus on the audiences evaluating the organization on socially constructed criteria that are 
legitimized by audiences. These criteria may or may not bear a significant relationship to financial 
performance outcomes and may frequently be symbolic and more holistic in nature (Deephouse, 
2000). Reputation thereby depends not on objective performance outcomes but on criteria that 
have the appearance of credibility (Oliver, 1991). Substantial research lends support to this 
perspective as well (Love & Kraatz, 2009; Staw & Epstein, 2000). I propose that in regards to 
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stakeholder management reputation, a middle ground combining both the economic and the social 
institutional perspectives are relevant. In other words, while substantive outcomes are significant, 
symbolic actions in regards to stakeholders also matter because they lead to attributions of ability 
for both the organization and its leaders even when their actual relationship to performance 
outcomes may remain unclear. At least three reasons suggest why such an approach may be 
feasible. First, unlike financial performance outcomes, accurate assessment of stakeholder 
management outcomes may require a longer time frame. Given the temporal lag, perceptions about 
strategic actions may attain high relevance in addition to actual outcomes themselves. Secondly, a 
perceptual assessment may also be relevant because of the high levels of uncertainty surrounding 
stakeholder management actions. This uncertainty arises because of the decoupling between 
stakeholder management actions and their relationship to objective performance outcomes such as 
firm financial performance. Given this uncertainty, even well informed audiences are likely to 
increase the magnitude of social construction, which in turn may inform how audiences judge its 
leaders. Third, a conceptualization that borrows from both the economic and the social institutional 
view of reputation would best allow accurate theorizing about how audiences construct images of 
their leaders which then inform their decisions on dismissal and compensation. 
This dissertation suggests that an organization develops two relatively distinct reputations 
concerning stakeholder management. Specifically, I conceptualize stakeholder management 
reputation as an overall judgment about an organization’s capability to engage with stakeholders, 
create positive spillovers and reduce negative spillovers. These judgments may in turn affect the 
type of attributions that board members may make about organizational leaders. The first is a 
reputation for “do good” stakeholder management and is an outcome of activities aimed at 
generating positive spillovers for stakeholders. This may be done directly through the production 
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of goods and services, or indirectly through the organization’s participation in societal needs 
leading to perceptions that the organization has the ability to enhance stakeholder welfare. The 
second, a reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management, is an outcome of activities aimed 
at reducing negative spillovers for stakeholders. Organizations may achieve such as reputation by 
ensuring compliance with extant local, national and global regulations leading to perceptions that 
the organization has the ability to prevent harm to stakeholders. Given that the reputation for 
“avoid harm” stakeholder management invites less attention except when the organization is under 
duress, it has understandably received less attention from scholars (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013). 
Moreover extant work has largely treated these two reputations monolithically (e.g., (Deckop, 
Merriman, & Gupta, 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001), which may be one reason for some of the 
seemingly contradictory findings about the effects of stakeholder management. While recent work 
has begun recognizing that there may be value in examining the effects of a reputation for "do 
good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management separately (Crilly, Ni, 
& Jiang, 2016; Minor & Morgan, 2011), the consequences of these distinct stakeholder reputations 
for CEOs need to be better understood.   
 The first study examines the consequences of stakeholder management reputation on CEO 
dismissal. CEO dismissal is a non-routine decision by the board that typically occurs when poor 
financial performance is attributed to the CEO (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). Therefore, in general, CEOs that escape causal attributions, 
either because they are seen as high ability CEOs or because they are seen as not being responsible 
for poor financial performance should be less likely to be dismissed. An organization’s reputation 
for stakeholder management may provide a mechanism by which evaluator attributions of its 
leaders may be affected. The study proposes that while both "do good" stakeholder management 
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reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may both provide a buffer against 
dismissal; the insurance-like effects of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be 
more powerful. A reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management underscores the 
importance of CEO vigilance and effective risk management. Since boards are likely to attach 
greater significance to vigilance and risk management when financial performance is poor, a 
reputation for avoiding harm may decrease the likelihood of negative attributions of CEO ability. 
In other words, CEOs should be less likely to be dismissed in the face of poor performance when 
the organization has a reputation for avoiding harm than when the organization has a reputation 
for doing good. The current study employs several analytical models to test this theory on a sample 
of S&P-500 firms for the period 2006-2014. The findings suggest that at low levels of firm 
financial performance, the marginal effects of reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder 
management on the relationship between firm performance and dismissal are stronger than similar 
effects of reputation for “do good” stakeholder management. The findings also suggest that 
organizations with high levels of reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management and low 
levels of reputation for “do good” stakeholder management are the least likely to dismiss their 
CEO’s in the face of poor financial performance. Overall, the study’s findings suggest that in the 
case of CEO dismissals, which are relatively rare events, avoiding negative internal attributions 
arising due to poor firm performance may depend partly on the firm’s reputation for “avoiding 
harm” rather than its reputation to “do good.” While existing theory provides evidence to suggest 
that stakeholder management in general provides insurance against poor firm performance 
(Hubbard et al., 2017), the current study finds that these effects may be largely driven by a 
reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management rather than a reputation for "do good" 
stakeholder management.  
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 The second study examines the relationship between stakeholder management reputation 
and CEO compensation. Unlike dismissal, which is a non-routine decision for the board, 
compensation decisions occur more frequently and CEOs typically receive additional 
compensation by proactively meeting goals and focusing on strategic actions that garner positive 
attention (Zajac & Westphal, 1995). Existing theory in this realm remains ambivalent to the 
distinction between a reputation for doing good and a reputation for avoiding harm (e.g. Coombs 
& Gilley, 2005). In contrast, the current study theorizes that strategic actions aimed at improving 
stakeholder welfare are associated with "do good" stakeholder management reputation. This 
reputation in turn may lead to positive attributions of CEO efficacy. On the other hand, strategic 
actions associated with reducing harm to stakeholders while enhancing an organization’s 
reputation for “avoiding harm” may also be associated with attributions of risk aversion on behalf 
of its CEO.  The study’s findings that a reputation for “do good” stakeholder management is 
positively associated with CEO compensation while a reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder 
management holds a negative association with CEO compensation appears to corroborate the 
theory. The findings provide further support for the distinct effects of reputation for “do good” and 
reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management. The study also explains and finds partial 
support for the role of financial performance, board independence, and information uncertainty as 
moderators of the relationship between stakeholder management and CEO compensation. The 
findings suggest that boards may focus on the presence of positive spillovers (i.e., reputation for 
"do good" stakeholder management) rather than the absence of negative spillovers (i.e., reputation 
for "avoid harm" stakeholder management) when determining CEO compensation packages.      
 Table 1 provides a summary of the building blocks of the theory developed in this 
dissertation including the definition for "do good" stakeholder management reputation and "avoid 
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harm" stakeholder management reputation with examples for the two. It also provides the synopsis 
of the underpinning mechanisms including the signals emanating from the two reputations and the 
attribution processes leading from the signals to the eventual outcomes for the CEO. For example, 
the table suggests that "do good" stakeholder management reputation signals underpinning ability 
of the CEO in relation to firm performance and that this assessment is used to make attributions 
for poor firm performance (i.e., whether the CEO was responsible). The table also highlights the 
supporting theories that help arrive at similar predictions without necessarily adopting a cognitive 
or behavioral perspective.      
 This dissertation theorizes that the reputation for both "do good" and “avoid harm” 
stakeholder management can trigger sensemaking processes that lead to distinct causal attributions 
regarding the CEO’s role. In doing so, the dissertation makes the following contributions. First, 
the dissertation contributes to the literature on CEO dismissal. The literature on CEO dismissal 
has typically focused on objective indicators of firm performance and paid less attention to the 
attributional processes that may be at play (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). By taking a more 
cognitive perspective, this study suggests that CEO attributions of ability may be influenced by an 
organization’s reputation for stakeholder management and that these attributions in turn determine 
the CEO’s survival. The dissertation also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation. CEO 
compensation has also largely focused on past performance as a strong determinant of CEO 
compensation. This study theorizes that an organization’s reputation for stakeholder management 
also affects attributions of initiative and risk taking which in turn affect CEO compensation. 
Additionally, the dissertation also contributes to the stakeholder management literature. This 
dissertation contributes to our understanding of how perceptions of a firm’s actions with non-
shareholder actors can influence the welfare of CEOs, over and above the influence of financial 
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performance. One of the key takeaways from these two studies is the idea that the same reputation 
can have different effects depending on the nature of the decision being made, suggesting the 
benefits of adopting a non- monolithic characterization of stakeholder management reputation.  
Overall, the findings of the dissertation suggest that while “doing good” seems to pay off for CEOs 
in the form of increased compensation, “avoiding harm” is actually more beneficial in the face of 
poor performance to avoid being dismissed.   
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STUDY 1: HOW STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT REPUTATION INFLUENCES 
CEO DISMISSAL  
CEO selection and succession continues to generate substantial interest amongst scholars. 
Within this broad academic area, researchers in multiple disciplines, including finance, accounting 
and management (e.g., (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Jenter & Kanaan, 2015; Puffer & Weintrop, 
1991), have focused on understanding when and why CEO’s get dismissed. To address this 
fundamental question, scholars have examined the effects of several variables such as external 
certifications of firm performance (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011),  power dynamics amongst top 
management teams (Shen & Cannella, 2002) and board demographics and social status 
(Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2015). While these studies have undoubtedly added to 
our understanding of several antecedents to dismissal, there is much room to explore the role of 
sensemaking processes that may influence CEO dismissal. Theories of board attention and 
cognition suggest that board members try to make sense of the CEO’s performance based on 
several measures of organizational effectiveness (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2006). This sensemaking process in turn gives rise to attributions for firm outcomes 
that ultimately determine whether the CEO will be retained or dismissed.  
To the extent that sensemaking and attributional processes inform the likelihood of 
dismissal, it becomes important to think about the factors that influence sensemaking processes. 
An obvious place to begin is financial performance. Several studies have shown that poor financial 
performance, both in absolute terms and relative to industry peers, is an important predictor of 
CEO dismissals (Boeker, 1992; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; 
Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).  However, the explanatory power of financial performance as a predictor 
of CEO dismissal has been called into question (Finkelstein et al., 2008, p. 169). This raises the 
possibility that attributional processes surrounding dismissal may also be dependent on other 
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measures of organizational effectiveness. One such measure may be related to the organization’s 
management of its stakeholders.  
Scholars increasingly recognize the importance of stakeholder management within the 
domain of strategic management (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013; Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997; Tantalo & Priem, 2016). A key perspective of stakeholder theory is that top managers 
are central actors in the organization’s relationships with its stakeholders, with a responsibility to 
identify, shape, and manage stakeholder relationships (Freeman, 1984). This theoretical 
perpsective is strongly supported by several anecdotal examples demonstrating the attention 
bestowed on CEOs whose organization’s develop a reputation for successfully managing their 
stakeholder relationships . For example, leaders such as Indra Nooyi of PepsiCo and Paul Polman 
of Unilever were consistently seen as the face of sustainable leadership despite generating intense 
shareholder debates regarding the strategic direction of their respective organizations (Abboud, 
2018, November 29; Colvin, 2012). The tendency to attribute an organization’s reputation for 
stakeholder management to its leaders is consistent with the need for evaluators to rely on 
sensemaking processes and attribute organizational successes and failures to its leaders (Meindl, 
Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). This study theorizes that an organization’s reputation for stakeholder 
management will inform attributions made on behalf of the CEO and that these attributions in turn 
will influence the likelihood of CEO dismissal. (Freeman, 1984).  
The study first proposes that organizations develop two relatively distinct reputations for 
stakeholder management. The first is a reputation for “doing good.” "Do good" stakeholder 
management reputation develops from strategic actions intended to create positive spillovers, such 
that these actions either directly enhance stakeholder welfare or are perceived to do so. This may 
be  achieved either directly through the production of products and services, or indirectly through 
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the organization’s participation in societal needs through mechanisms such as philanthropy and 
volunteerism. Much of the literature to date has focused on "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation. However, as organizations engage with their stakeholders, they must also consider the 
need to “avoid harm.” "Avoid harm" stakeholder management is concerned with reducing negative 
spillovers and enacting strategies that emphasize vigilance.  By engaging in such actions over time, 
organizations develop a reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management.  
Drawing on theories about sensemaking and attribution, the study develops theory about 
how the reputations for "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management inform the likelihood of CEO dismissal.  I begin by theorizing that both reputations 
for "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reduce the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal. However, the attribution processes may change when evaluators also 
draw on information about firm performance. Given this change in the attribution processes, I 
theorize that a reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management will be especially powerful in 
weakening the effect of firm performance on CEO dismissals. Finally the study also theorizes that 
a configuration emphasizing high reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management and 
relatively low reputation for “do good” stakeholder management has the strongest effect on 
weakening the relationship between firm performance and dismissal. The study empirically tests 
the impact of these two reputations for stakeholder management on the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal using a large sample of S&P-500 firms over a 9-year period and finds partial support for 
the predictions. 
The study makes the following contributions. First, the study enhances understanding of 
the role of stakeholder management reputation for CEOs. Specifically, this study provides 
additional theoretical nuance to existing work. Prior work has shown that boards’ preference for 
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weighting social performance as an antecedent to CEO dismissal is contingent upon firm financial 
performance (Hubbard et al., 2017). By demonstrating that the reputations for "do good" 
stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management may have different effects, 
this study extends extant findings. Second, the study also responds to a call to adopt a cognitive 
framework in explaining CEO dismissals (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006) . The study theorizes 
that stakeholder management reputations inform sensemaking and attributions of CEO efficacy 
and thus informs the dismissal decision. Third, the study’s findings have implications for the 
literatures on organization theory and strategic management (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). 
The studies provide support for a more expansive view of organizational effectiveness that goes 
beyond the domain of financial and operational performance. Specifically, the results of the two 
studies appear to provide support to political and economic perspectives of organizational 
effectiveness wherein the CEO’s success is determined by value judgments about the 
organization’s relationship with a broad set of stakeholders (Nord, 1983).  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 The study develops a theoretical perspective to explain how an organization’s reputation 
for stakeholder management can impact CEO dismissal decisions. There are three key features to 
this theory. The first is that CEO dismissal decisions are outcomes of board level cognitive 
processes (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). While it seems reasonable 
that board members would base CEO succession decisions on financial performance, several 
studies suggest that financial performance explains a fairly limited amount of variance in these 
actions. In fact, CEO dismissal occurs for a variety of reasons and some studies suggest that CEOs 
may be dismissed even when organizations are not performing poorly (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 
2011). This lack of consistency in the variance predicted by financial performance in succession 
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suggests that board members may be undertaking a sensemaking process vis-à-vis firm 
performance. It also suggests that board members may look to other organizational level outcomes 
as signals that are pertinent in their sensemaking processes.  
The second feature of this study’s theory is that an organization’s reputation for stakeholder 
management appears to be particularly salient as one such outcome relevant to the sensemaking 
process. Stakeholder management reputation (i.e., the degree to which the strategic actions of the 
organization in relation to its stakeholders either create positive spillovers or reduce negative 
spillovers or are perceived to do so) is a central feature of corporate reputation (Fombrun, 2005) 
which in turn is likely to be a key concern for the board. Research also suggests that board members 
appear to hold strong stakeholder orientations and are keenly aware of the organization’s ability, 
or perceived ability, to manage these relationships successfully (Wang & Dewhirst, 1992). To the 
extent that CEO’s are perceived to play an important role in shaping stakeholder reputations I 
propose that stakeholder reputation is likely to activate board level sensemaking processes.   
The third feature of the theory is the explication of the attributional processes (Kelley, 
1973) that link reputation for stakeholder management to CEO dismissal. Stakeholder reputation 
is likely to enter into board members decisions via two conduits (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). 
First, I posit that stakeholder management reputation affects dispositional attributions and 
specifically attributions of CEO efficacy. These efficacy assessments in turn influence the 
likelihood of dismissals. The second and probably more prevalent conduit is through causal 
attributions of firm performance. That is, the extent to which board members make sense of firm 
performance and attribute poor performance to the CEO is likely to depend on stakeholder 
management reputation. These attributions will in turn, inform dismissal decisions. This argument 
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is buttressed by research on attribution theory which suggests that sensemaking and attributional 
processes are context dependent (Jones & Davis, 1965).   
From attributions to CEO dismissals 
 A consistent finding across several empirical studies is that poor firm performance often 
precipitates CEO dismissal (Boeker, 1992; Brookman & Thistle, 2009; Denis et al., 1997; Jenter 
& Kanaan, 2015). Yet despite the importance of financial performance in this stream of research, 
the variance explained by firm performance is less than what intuition would suggest (Furtado & 
Karan, 1990). One study even demonstrated that nearly half of the CEOs of more than 2000 listed 
companies in US Stock Exchanges were dismissed despite positive shareholder returns (Ertugrul 
& Krishnan, 2011). These studies highlight the fact that CEO dismissal decisions are complex and 
are influenced by a variety of factors in addition to financial performance.  
 One proposal put forth by scholars is to explain dismissals as part of a sensemaking process 
by the board (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). This process is shaped by 
the fundamental belief that there are strong linkages between organizational level outcomes and 
the CEO’s ability (Jones & Davis, 1965) such that poor performance suggests low levels of ability. 
These attribution processes are a natural consequence of the difficulty that boards often face in 
observing CEO behavior and ability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consistent with the general model of 
sensemaking (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974),  board members are prone 
to rely on information that is easily accessible and then make efficacy assessments (dispositional 
attributions) of the CEO which ultimately affects the decision to dismiss or retain the CEO. While 
firm performance itself plays an important role in this sensemaking and attribution processes, the 
lack of consistently strong effects in the firm performance – dismissal link suggests that board 
members may also rely on other organizational level outcomes to make attributions of CEO ability.  
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Reputation for stakeholder management 
 I propose that one such outcome that board members may rely on is the organization’s 
reputation for stakeholder management. However, before elaborating the theoretical mechanisms 
and developing the hypotheses, a brief explanation of what this study means by stakeholder 
management reputation is in order. I conceptualize stakeholder management reputation as 
consisting of two distinctive reputations. The first, a reputation for “doing good” is driven by 
strategic actions that go above and beyond compliance. Given their ability to generate positive 
spillovers as well as generate positive perceptions of stakeholder engagement, such strategic 
actions may be seen as constituting proactive engagement with stakeholders (Crilly et al., 2016).  
As such, a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management is preceded by the deployment of 
strategies perceived to extend beyond legal requirements. Additionally, "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation may also manifest in the organization taking a lead in addressing 
stakeholder issues, or by deliberately pursuing awards and certifications (Crilly et al., 2016; 
Shropshire & Hillman, 2007; Stahl & De Luque, 2014). For example, organizations may 
proactively invest in renewable power generation, manage climate change related risks, establish 
and enhance community relations with indigenous communities and work to counter human rights 
violations in supply chains involving distant third party suppliers. All of these actions are likely to 
be seen as proactive attempts to manage stakeholders in positive ways and would typically result 
in a firm attaining a higher "do good" stakeholder management reputation. The second type of 
stakeholder reputation is a reputation for “avoiding harm.” "Avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation is driven by strategic actions focused on reducing negative spillovers.  As such, a 
reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management is preceded by the deployment of strategies 
aimed at ensuring compliance with the law. "Avoid harm" stakeholder management manifests in 
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organizations avoiding negative publicity through a focus on vigilance. For example, organizations 
develop "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputations by avoiding involvement in legal 
issues related to climate change, monitoring complicity in state sponsored violence, or preventing 
labor abuse in the supply chain. Note that organizations that have high "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation may have low levels of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. 
In other words, the theory developed here does not require the two reputations to be at two ends 
of a continuum.  
For a signal to be incorporated into sensemaking and attribution processes it must be 
accessible, perceived to be valid and must hold relevance to the evaluator (Heider, 1958; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). Reputations for "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management appear to meet these criteria. With relation to accessibility, stakeholder 
management reputations are accessible through media, consumer forums and information 
intermediaries such as ratings agencies. To the extent that these reputations are easily accessible, 
they are likely to serve as a key driver of investment and other organizational decisions. For 
example, there has been a substantial increase in socially responsible investing (Chava, 2014; 
Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). Additionally, influential mediators such as the media and security 
analysts also consider stakeholder reputation as a key dimension of organizational leadership 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; McGinn, 2017). Given that leaders receive disproportionate attention 
for reputations of their organizations (Meindl et al., 1985), it is reasonable to suggest that 
stakeholder reputations are perceived as pertinent to attributions of CEO efficacy and firm 
performance. In relation to signal relevance for the evaluator, scholarship suggests that boards 
exhibit high levels of attention towards stakeholder management (Wang & Dewhirst, 1992). This 
is not surprising given that directors may be able to enhance their own reputations via the 
   
 
 19 
organization’s reputation for stakeholder management (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Research on 
attribution theory suggests that the evaluator’s attention to signals pertinent to attributional 
processes depend on their own subjective needs (Blau, 1964; Heider, 1958). To the extent that 
stakeholder reputation can itself add positive utility to the board members, it follows that it may 
be relevant to attributions of CEO efficacy and firm performance. Taken together, these insights 
suggest the desirability of a theoretical framework in which board sensemaking processes are 
understood to partially be informed by stakeholder management reputations.  
From stakeholder reputations to attributions 
As mentioned previously, stakeholder management reputation could influence CEO 
dismissal through two conduits. The first mechanism is through dispositional attribution and the 
second is through causal attribution. While there may be several types of dispositional attributions, 
this study’s theory specifically references attributions of CEO efficacy. Research suggests that 
stakeholder reputations generate positive spillovers. For example stakeholder reputations 
positively affect corporate reputation (Fombrun, 2005), improve organizational legitimacy 
(Bitektine, 2011), help firms avoid legal sanctions (Parker, 2002), increase competitiveness 
(Barney, 1991), help retain customer loyalty (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003) and lead to positive 
media coverage (Malik, 2015). To the extent that the aforementioned positive spillovers are seen 
as outcomes of deliberate decision-making and to the extent that the CEO is considered partly 
responsible for these decisions, boards are likely to perceive that the CEO has been successful in 
developing strong stakeholder relationships in addition to vigilantly monitoring organizational 
outcomes.  
The second conduit through which stakeholder management reputation affects CEO 
dismissal is through causal explanations concerning (poor) firm performance. While factors other 
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than objective financial performance have been shown to play a major role in CEO dismissal 
decisions, a consistent finding has been that features related to firm performance, including relative 
firm performance (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015), historical performance against earnings expectations 
(Puffer & Weintrop, 1991), and analysts certifications of firm performance (Wiersema & Zhang, 
2011) are significant predictors of CEO dismissal (Finkelstein et al., 2008). Based on this insight, 
I propose that causal attributions of firm performance will be salient criteria for dismissal 
decisions. Consistent with scholarship on attribution theory (Hilton, Smith, & Kin, 1995; Miller, 
Smith, & Uleman, 1981), evaluators attempt to determine the extent to which the actor is 
responsible for the outcome. Within the context of this study, board members are ascertaining the 
extent to which the CEO can be made responsible for poor firm performance (Khurana, 2004). I 
maintain that such causal attributions of firm performance will be influenced by stakeholder 
management reputation. I develop these ideas further in the hypotheses section.   
Main effects 
 
The study defined "do good" stakeholder management reputation as the collective 
judgment regarding strategic actions taken by the organization to create positive spillovers relating 
to stakeholders. Given that desired end states are aspirational and therefore fraught with 
uncertainty, CEOs may face challenges in convincing the board and the shareholders that resources 
should be allocated towards "do good" stakeholder management. Additionally, attaining a 
reputation for "do good" stakeholder management may require substantial internal reorganization, 
articulating a stakeholder centric vision for the organization and developing and strengthening 
relationships with multiple stakeholders. For instance, in positioning PepsiCo as a leader in social 
responsibility, the CEO Indra Nooyi undertook an intense organizational restructuring effort 
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creating several new research laboratories, hiring nutritional scientists and playing a public role in 
addressing the obesity related public health crisis (Reingold, 2015; Seabrook, 2011).  
Despite these potential challenges, the rewards for a reputation to “do good” could be 
substantial for organizations. Scholarship suggests that an organization’s reputation for "do good" 
stakeholder management can provide competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001). There are several ways by which this may be achieved. For instance "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation can bring external rewards such as certifications and favorable 
media coverage (Cahan, Chen, Chen, & Nguyen, 2015; Fombrun, 2005).  "Do good" stakeholder 
management reputation may also increase customer commitment towards the organization (Sen, 
Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006). Additionally, several studies suggest that a reputation for "do 
good" stakeholder management may also help attract better qualified employees (Albinger & 
Freeman, 2000; Turban & Greening, 1997), improve job satisfaction (Valentine & Fleischman, 
2008) and increase employee commitment (Brammer, Millington, & Rayton, 2007). Scholars have 
also suggested that acquiring a reputation for proactively engaging with stakeholders as opposed 
to responding to legal mandates may help foster innovation (Nidumolu, Prahalad, & Rangaswami, 
2009). Stakeholder reputations gained by engaging in proactive strategies have also been shown 
to increase organizational access to political resources (Zhao, 2012). To the extent that the above 
spillovers related to third-party certifications, customer retention, employee commitment, 
innovation and access to political power are perceived to be value enhancing "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation, should lead to more positive attributions of CEO efficacy.  
A reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management develops through a focus on 
reducing negative spillovers. Given that publicly owned organizations are subject to high levels of 
scrutiny by primary and secondary stakeholders, a reputation for “avoiding harm” is critical to 
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several organizational outcomes. For example, establishing a reputation for "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management may help avoid negative publicity and unwelcome media attention either 
directly or through negative shareholder reactions (Brammer & Pavelin, 2005). This is particularly 
relevant because evaluators see negative media coverage as more salient than positive coverage 
(Bednar, 2012). Additionally, a reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management also has 
implications for an organization’s relationships with its consumers. Empirical research suggests 
that a weak reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management can magnify the likelihood of 
generating negative moral emotions amongst consumers and increase consumer willingness to 
bestow punishments on the organization (Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2013; Sweetin, Knowles, 
Summey, & McQueen, 2013).  
There are also advantages related to access to finance. Multiple empirical studies suggest 
that a reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management can decrease the cost of capital (Chava, 
2014; Goss & Roberts, 2011). Although a reputation for “avoiding harm” may be less visible than 
a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management because this is manifested in the low levels of 
stakeholder related concerns, boards are likely to consider vigilance as an important feature of 
CEO efficacy. A major reason for this is that a reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management is closely linked to organizational legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011). Reducing negative 
spillovers also has important implications for the organization’s ability to engage employees. In 
particular, lax standards in compliance has been found to be a strong predictor of employee burnout 
leading to low levels of job engagement (Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011).  In line with 
the above arguments, a reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management is likely to foster 
organizational effectiveness and lead to positive attributions of CEO efficacy. The above 
arguments motivate the following hypotheses.  
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Hypothesis 1a: Reputation for "do good" stakeholder management decreases the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
Hypothesis 1b: Reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management decreases the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
 
Stakeholder reputation as insurance against poor firm performance 
Besides attributions of CEO efficacy, stakeholder management reputation may also 
influence attributions of causality relating to firm performance. While several studies have 
demonstrated that some form of firm performance can predict CEO dismissals, absolute firm 
performance alone explains minimal variance in the likelihood of dismissal. For instance, in one 
study the dismissal rates of the top 10% of the sample was 12.8% as against 8.6% for the bottom 
10% of firms ranked on stock performance (Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988). The comparatively 
minimal change in dismissal rates in the face of a wider change in firm performance suggests that 
rather than simply relying on firm performance per se, evaluators may base their dismissal 
decisions on whether they perceive the CEO to have been responsible for poor firm performance 
(Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006).  
One factor that may affect the causality attribution is the attribution of CEO efficacy. 
CEO’s perceived to be more effective may be less likely to be blamed for poor financial 
performance. This idea is also explained by research on attribution theory. Evaluators look for 
consistent information in making attributions of causality (Kelley, 1972). The higher the 
consistency of the signals, the more likely is the attribution to internal (CEO) causes over external 
causes (factors beyond the CEO’s control). Accordingly, I expect that if attributions of CEO 
efficacy are positive, then the board is less likely to make internal attributions of firm performance. 
While attributions of CEO efficacy may arise from several sources, a major source of this 
assessment could be the reputation for stakeholder management. This is not surprising given that 
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stakeholder management is considered a core CEO responsibility. Overall the above arguments 
imply that high reputations for stakeholder management, could act as a buffer against the effect of 
firm performance on the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Thus, I expect the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 2a: Reputation for "do good" stakeholder management weakens the negative 
effect of firm performance on the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management weakens the 
negative effect of firm performance on the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
 
“Do good” or “avoid harm” reputation?  
 I now build the argument for which of the two reputations has a stronger moderating effect 
on the relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal. Specifically, I propose that 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation will have a stronger influence than "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation due to the following reasons. First, there are inconsistent 
findings regarding the positive relationship between “do good” stakeholder management 
reputation and firm financial performance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  In fact, some evidence 
suggests “doing good” may even have a negative association with firm financial performance 
(Zhao & Murrell, 2016). However, the effect of “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation 
is relatively straightforward to interpret with success represented by the absence of legal violations 
or controversies leading to a reputation for compliance. So in comparison to "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation, the financial implications of avoid harm reputation are relatively clear.  
Second, in comparison to “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation, understanding 
the CEO’s motivation behind "do good" stakeholder management reputation is likely to present a 
greater challenge for the board. While a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management may 
generally have positive consequences for the organization, it also presents an opportunity for the 
CEO to extract private benefits. Scholarship suggests that CEOs may be able to collude with some 
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stakeholders to extract private benefits (Surroca & Tribó, 2008). Such collusions also provide 
opportunities for CEOs to entrench themselves which in turn may have negative implications for 
financial performance (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). However, "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation is unlikely to generate doubtful perceptions of CEO efficacy. Thus, the signal of CEO 
efficacy that arises from "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be of higher clarity 
and consequently attain greater salience in determining the extent to which the CEO is seen as 
having caused poor firm performance.  
Third, in comparison to “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation, “do good” 
stakeholder management reputation is fraught with the possibility of being misinterpreted or even 
being opposed by stakeholders and the internal organization. Since stakeholders may have separate 
and distinct expectations (Campbell, 2007), satisfying one stakeholder increases the probability 
that other stakeholders who have been accorded less salience are dissatisfied (De Bakker & Den 
Hond, 2008). Furthermore "do good" stakeholder management reputation may not be perceived as 
reflecting the organization’s values or intentions, increasing the probability that its strategic 
antecedents are perceived as inauthentic (Rowley, 1997; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Bozok, 2006a). 
So "do good" stakeholder management reputation may result in real or perceived disparities in 
resource allocation amongst stakeholders. However, "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation may be less subject to the above interpretations because the avoidance of harm is likely 
to be seen as a basic expectation. Therefore, when arriving at attributions of CEO efficacy when 
firm performance is low, boards may find more information that is pertinent with a reputation for 
“avoid harm” stakeholder management in comparison with a reputation for “do good” stakeholder 
management.  
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It is important at this stage to highlight the nature of the audience perceiving stakeholder 
management strategies and evaluating the CEO. Although some scholarship suggests that avoid 
harm stakeholder management reputation may be perceived by some stakeholders as merely 
compliance driven and therefore less effective than a "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006b), board members 
are likely to value compliance more than most other stakeholders and therefore be more 
appreciative of vigilant approaches to stakeholder management in comparison to other evaluators. 
Given the differences between “do good” stakeholder management reputation and “avoid harm” 
stakeholder management reputation in establishing precise links to financial performance, the 
difficulty in assessing strategic intent and the likelihood of being misinterpreted, the following 
hypothesis is set forth. 
Hypothesis 3: Relative to a reputation for “do good” stakeholder management, a 
reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management weakens the relationship between 
firm performance and CEO dismissal more strongly. 
 
A configurational perspective 
Thus far, the study has explained the theoretical mechanisms linking stakeholder 
management reputation and CEO dismissal. A core assumption in the theory developed so far is 
that boards consider these reputations independently and there is a clear inflexion point when too 
much of "do good" stakeholder management becomes unfeasible and when too less of "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management becomes problematic to CEO survival. While this assumption has 
been made to aid theory development (Lam, 2010), a more realistic approach would suggest that 
organizations have stocks of both types of stakeholder management reputations. Further, boards 
are likely to consider these reputations generally (high/low levels) rather than specifically. Several 
considerations suggest that conceptualizing stakeholder management reputation as a configuration 
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of “do good” stakeholder management and “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation is 
feasible. 
First, a configurational approach adopts a more realistic assumption regarding 
organizational reputation for stakeholder management. It embraces the perspective that 
organizations simultaneously hold distinct "do good" and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputations. For example, with regards to health snacks within its product portfolio, PepsiCo has a 
"do good" stakeholder management reputation (PepsiCo, 2014; Reingold, 2015) and with regards 
to beverages its "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation is questionable (Simon, 2011). 
In this vein, the configurational approach also makes a more realistic assumption regarding board 
level cognition. To the extent that board members rely on a limited number of heuristic principles 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), their perceptions of stakeholder management reputation are likely 
to be on simple (high /low levels) rather than on more complex scales. Second, by conceptualizing 
stakeholder management reputation as a configuration, the explanatory variable1 accounts for the 
full range of management strategies that CEOs may undertake in managing stakeholders. For 
example, a CEO may focus on addressing existing concerns or controversies related to worker 
compensation while choosing to invest in programs to improve hiring practices that encourage 
diversity thus partially reducing negative spillovers and increasing positive spillovers.  A third 
(empirical) consideration is that a configuration approach advances the view that “do good” and 
“avoid harm” reputations do not exist on a continuum and that these reputations are not 
substitutable (Kölbel, Busch, & Jancso, 2017). In so doing, a generalized measure of reputation 
high/low levels of both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder 
                                              
1  Stakeholder reputation consisting of high/low levels of both "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. 
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management reputation partially addresses the empirical limitations of using a single continuous 
measure of stakeholder management reputation (Minor & Morgan, 2011; Van der Laan, Van Ees, 
& Van Witteloostuijn, 2008). 
One could imagine four different types of configurations that represent the organization’s 
configurational representation of stakeholder management reputation (Figure 1). The first 
configuration is low levels of both “do good” stakeholder management reputation and “avoid 
harm” stakeholder management reputation. This configuration signals that the CEO has failed to 
not only create positive spillovers but has violated basic stakeholder expectations of vigilance and 
compliance. A second configuration is high levels of “do good” stakeholder management 
reputation and low levels of “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation. This configuration 
too appears to be undesirable because it signals that the CEO (a) failed to address minimal 
stakeholder needs (stakeholder responsibility relative to irresponsibility) and (b) devoted attention 
towards secondary responsibilities whose impact on financial performance has been called to 
question.  A third configuration is represented by high level of “do good” stakeholder management 
and high level of “avoid harm” stakeholder management. Under this configuration, the theory 
developed so far would suggest that while boards would make positive efficacy attributions; causal 
attributions of poor firm performance may implicate the CEO given the high level of "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation. This is because of the difficulty of assessing the value of "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation to firm performance, the likelihood of CEO 
entrenchment and the plausibility of misinterpretation. The fourth and final configuration is low 
level of “do good” stakeholder management reputation and high levels of “avoid harm” 
stakeholder management reputation. Under this configuration while efficacy attributions may lag 
those in the previous configuration, causal attributions would be less negative than the previous 
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configuration.  Given the low level of "do good" stakeholder management reputation, the board is 
less likely to interpret that CEO attention has been diverted from firm performance towards 
secondary responsibilities such as enhancing "do good" stakeholder management reputation. 
Based on the above insights, the following hypotheses emerge.  
Hypothesis 4a: CEOs whose firms have a reputation for low levels of “do good” and high 
levels of “avoid harm” stakeholder management will be least likely to be dismissed.  
Hypothesis 4b: CEOs whose firms have a reputation for low levels of “do good” and high 
levels of “avoid harm” stakeholder management will be least likely to be dismissed due to 
poor firm performance. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
To create the sample, I included all companies that formed part of the S&P-500 as of the 
1st of January 2006 and tracked them from 2006-2014 to reduce selection bias. Firm performance 
data were constructed using financial information drawn from Compustat. CEO related 
information was obtained from ExecuComp. Data for governance variables including board size 
and board independence were obtained from BoardEx. I constructed CEO dismissal information 
using several electronic sources such as company press releases, 10-K filings and newspaper 




 A challenge faced by researchers in identifying CEO dismissals is that firms often report 
these events as voluntary departures or do not report them at all (Khurana, 2004). Consistent with 
previous work (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), I took great care to ensure that 
CEO dismissals were correctly identified. First, I identified all succession events prior to 
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December 31st 2014. Then, using information from news sources, I identified voluntary departures 
(such as retirement, consistent with identification methods used in past research (Wiersema & 
Zhang, 2011) and those due to due to death, health related concerns or due to a spinoff or 
bankruptcy. For the remaining departures, which remained unclassified, I further analyzed news 
reports and collected information from SEC filings and severance agreements. I identified a 
dismissal event if it met any of the following criteria: (1) there was unequivocal information that 
the CEO was dismissed from the company’s press release as well as multiple news reports; (2) the 
resignation was unexpected and news reports identified performance issues and the company 
released an earnings statement prior to the departure or immediately after departure recognizing 
its failure to meet earnings expectations; or (3) for all other cases where criteria 1 or 2 were not 
satisfied, I collected information on the CEO’s board status (if the CEO was ousted from the 
board), whether the CEO was succeeded by an interim CEO signifying no succession plan, whether 
the CEO was not retained as an advisor or consultant, whether the CEO’s actual departure date 
was prior to the announced departure date (from the SEC 8K filing) and whether the CEO did not 
take up a high profile assignment following departure from the firm. For criteria 3 to be satisfied, 
each of the above sub-criteria had to be coded as a “Yes.” I also took care not to code as dismissals 
those cases where there was evidence of dismissal due to personal misconduct as such reasons may 
obfuscate the relevance of firm performance as salient to board members’ causal attribution. I 
adopted this conservative approach to ensure that some form of firm financial performance 
remained the overwhelming reason for the CEO to be dismissed. Following the above approach, I 
identified 81 CEO dismissals; and the final sample consisted of 58 dismissals. I coded the 
dependent variable as ‘1’ if the CEO was dismissed in a given year. For firms where there was 
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either a voluntary departure or a routine succession event or the CEO remained in the role, the 
dependent variable was coded as ‘0’. 
 
Explanatory Variables  
 
Firm performance 
 It is generally accepted that one of the key responsibilities of the board is to represent the 
interests of shareholders (Shen & Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006). So boards are likely to be 
sensitive to measures such as total shareholder return (TSR) that partially capture the extent to 
which shareholders gain from their investments in the firm. I operationalize TSR as the ratio of 
the annual change in stock price plus dividends divided by the opening price of the stock adjusted 
for industry effects. Use of TSR to operationalize firm performance is consistent with recent 
scholarship on CEO dismissal (Flickinger et al., 2015).  
Stakeholder management reputation 
 For assessing stakeholder management reputation the study relies on the KLD database.  
The KLD database has been in existence since 1991 and is an annual dataset of positive and 
negative indicators applicable to several facets of stakeholder management. The data set is 
available for a large universe of publicly listed organizations in the US and several other countries. 
A large team of trained analysts examines publicly available information and assigns scores to 
positive and negative indicators from many different categories to specific firms. The analysts are 
trained to assess if stakeholder strategies increase positive spillovers (KLD strengths) or fail to 
reduce negative spillovers (KLD concerns). Given the perceptual nature of the assessment, an 
aggregate measure of the strengths and a separate aggregated measure for concerns provide a 
reasonable proxy for the two stakeholder management reputations. The use of KLD scores is fairly 
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well established in stakeholder management scholarship (Kölbel et al., 2017; Petrenko et al., 
2016). Broadly, the KLD descriptors can be classified into environment, community, employee 
relations, diversity, and product and governance indicators. Each of these broad indicators has 
multiple components for both positive and negative spillovers that are scored separately. For 
example, in the area of employee health and safety, a score of ‘1’ is assigned when the organization 
is perceived as proactively approaching health and safety challenges. Similarly, a score of ‘1’ is 
assigned to the concerns dimension when there is evidence for controversies related to health and 
safety, giving the organization a lack of reputation for vigilance.  
I use the aggregate KLD strengths and concerns to operationalize reputation for “do good” 
stakeholder management and reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management respectively. 
There are several reasons why such an approach may also in general be suitable. In the first place, 
the assessment criteria that KLD uses to score the positive and negative spillovers are not the same. 
In other words, the absence of strength cannot be assessed as the presence of a concern or vice 
versa (Agle et al., 1999; Hillman & Keim, 2001). For example, a company’s investments in carbon 
efficient technologies may not compensate for poor adherence to existing environmental 
guidelines. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, KLD scores are closer approximations of 
perceptions of strategic actions rather than actual evidence for outcomes (Hart & Sharfman, 2015; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006). Therefore, in assessing the KLD strengths and weaknesses separately, 
the current study retains consistency with the conceptualization of “do good” stakeholder 
management reputation and “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation approaches as 
reflecting the collective opinions of trained analysts.   
 I reverse code the concerns score for ease of understanding, and to suggest that the 
company successfully developed a reputation for avoiding concerns and controversies. I combine 
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the component scores for strengths and concerns separately to arrive at an overall score for 
reputation for “do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management respectively giving each of 
the strength and concerns components equal weight. In doing so, this study’s method is consistent 
with previous work (Mattingly & Berman, 2006). However, a challenge in assessing the KLD 
scores is that differences in scores may be strongly predicted by industry differences (Cai, Jo, & 
Pan, 2012; Mattingly, 2017). To partially account for these differences, the final scores for “do 
good” stakeholder management and “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation are 
standardized using 2-digit SIC codes. 
Control Variables 
 I included a number of control variables in this study’s analysis. Evaluators may also be 
sensitive to other measures of firm performance so I controlled for return on assets (ROA). 
Specifically, I used ROA adjusted for industry differences. I also controlled for the industry- 
adjusted market to book ratio. I control for board size because it may influence decision-making 
capability and consequently the likelihood of CEO dismissal (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005). I 
control for board independence as insiders and outsiders may have differing perceptions regarding 
what constitutes CEO efficacy (Yermack, 1996). I operationalize board independence as the ratio 
of independent directors to board size. I also control for CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO duality 
because these features exhibit strong linkages to the likelihood of CEO dismissals (Weisbach, 
1988). I operationalize CEO age by calculating the number of years between the focal year and 
their date of birth. I operationalize tenure as the number of years spent in the company as CEO. I 
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research studies suggest that decisions to dismiss may, in part, be determined by the CEO’s 
shareholding in the firm. Consistent with recent scholarship (Finkelstein et al., 2008; Jenter & 
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Kanaan, 2015), I operationalize CEO ownership as high or low ownership based on ownership 
greater than or equal to 5% and less than 5% respectively. I also control for firm size by taking the 
natural logarithm of sales in million USD.  
Analysis 
In this study, I examine the relationship between stakeholder management reputation and 
CEO dismissal. However, one concern in the empirical approach is the potential endogeneity 
between stakeholder management and other factors such as firm financial performance and 
organizational size that may influence the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Specifically, stakeholder 
management reputation may itself be an artifact of features such as organizational size and firm 
performance. This can occur for several reasons. First, performance and size may inform resource 
allocation decisions towards stakeholder management. For instance, larger organizations and those 
exhibiting higher levels of financial performance may be able to make more durable investments 
towards creating positive spillovers or mitigating negative spillovers. Second, research suggests 
that social evaluations such as reputation are strongly influenced by accounting and market based 
measures either directly or indirectly through their ability to gather greater levels of media attention 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). For these reasons it is important to identify whether “do good” 
stakeholder management and “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation has an 
independent effect over and above that of firm financial performance and organization size on the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal. To address this issue, I create a proxy for both "do good" and "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management reputation that bears minimal correlation with firm financial 
performance and firm size. Specifically, I regress “do good” stakeholder management and “avoid 
harm” stakeholder management on accounting and market-based measures of financial 
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performance and organization size by estimating the following model for each measure of “do 
good” stakeholder management and “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation.  
 
Reputation for Stakeholder Management = Industry-adjusted total shareholder return 
(TSR)+Industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) + Industry-adjusted market-to-book 
+ Firm size (log of sales) + time (year dummies) 
Table 2 reports the results of this regression. Both "do good" stakeholder management and 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation are positively related to ROA. Furthermore, "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation is positively related to firm size while "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation is negatively related to firm size corroborating that stakeholder 
management reputation may be an artifact of some measures of firm performance and 
organizational size. Residuals obtained from these regressions may be considered as the 
component of "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation that is uncorrelated with accounting and market-based measures of firm performance 
and firm size. I use the residuals from these models as proxies for "do good" stakeholder 
management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. By using this approach, 
potential endogeneity between stakeholder management reputation and firm level factors such as 
performance and size is minimized. 
 Since the dependent variable is dichotomous where CEO dismissal is coded as 1 and 0 if 
there was no dismissal event, logistic regression models are appropriate. However, a potential 
concern is the unobserved heterogeneity between multiple observations for each firm. This 
problem may be overcome by using either fixed or random effects models so that there are 
additional CEO specific error terms. Therefore, I tested the efficacy of both random and fixed 
effects models. I used a Hausman test to determine if the errors are correlated with the regressors. 
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I find that the coefficient is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the preferred model is a 
random effects model. Additionally, I observe that using a fixed effects model would bias the 
estimates severely because there are a number of firms that do not contain a dismissal event. 
Employing a fixed effects model would lead to a large number of observations being dropped by 
STATA. I also report results from robustness checks done using random effects probit models and 
GEE models.   
 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The individual VIF scores were 
obtained using the COLLIN function in STATA. The variables of interest do not have high VIFs 




Table 4 reports the results of the regression models. As expected, firm performance in all 
the models is negatively related to dismissal. The first set of hypotheses (Models 1-3) predicted 
that stakeholder management reputation would decrease the likelihood of CEO dismissal. I found 
no support for the first part of this prediction (Hypothesis 1a) as the coefficient for "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation is positive and insignificant (b=0.001, p=n.s). Hypothesis 1b 
predicted that "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation would be negatively related to 
CEO dismissal. The magnitude of the coefficient was in the expected direction but not significant 
(b=-0.001, p=n.s). This suggests no support for Hypothesis 1b. The next set of hypotheses relates 
to the effects of stakeholder management reputation on the relationship between firm performance 
and likelihood of CEO dismissal. Hypothesis 2a predicted that "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation would weaken the relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal.  I found 
no support for this prediction as the interaction term Industry-adjusted total shareholder return* 
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"Do good" stakeholder management is negative and insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported. Next, I test the effect of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation on the 
relationship between firm performance and dismissal (Models 4-6). I find that the interaction term 
(Industry-adjusted total shareholder return *Avoid harm stakeholder management) is significant 
and in the expected direction for all the three models (b=0.014, p<0.01; b=0.007,p<0.01; b=0.015, 
0<0.01). The positive sign indicates that as reputation for “avoiding harm” improves, the 
relationship between firm performance and the likelihood of dismissal is weakened, suggesting 
that the causal attributions of firm performance become weaker.  
To additionally corroborate the strength of the moderating effects of "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation (Hypothesis 2b), I compute the marginal effects of the 
interaction term on the relationship between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable. 
Testing the marginal effect is consistent with suggestions on improving interpretations of logit 
models (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
Specifically, I compute the marginal effects of firm performance on the probability of CEO 
dismissal at different values of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. I report the 
marginal effects for firm performance in Table 5. I find that the relationship between firm 
performance (Industry-adjusted TSR) and dismissal is less negative at higher values of "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management reputation showing a generally positive moderating effect of avoid 
harm stakeholder management reputation. These results indicate that holding all values constant 
at the sample mean except for "avoid harm" stakeholder management, higher values of "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management reduce the influence of firm performance on the probability of 
CEO dismissal corroborating Hypothesis 2b.  
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To test Hypothesis 3 (Models 7-9), I include both interaction terms and find that the 
coefficient for the interaction term, Industry-adjusted total shareholder return * "Avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation to be positive and significant ((b=0.015, p<0.01; b=0.008, 
p<0.01; b=0.015, 0<0.01). The coefficient for the interaction term, Industry-adjusted total 
shareholder return* "Do good" stakeholder management reputation is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Further, the magnitude of the coefficient of the interaction term for "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management is higher than that for the interaction term for "do good" stakeholder 
management corroborating Hypothesis 3. Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
interaction term (Industry-adjusted total shareholder return*Avoid harm stakeholder management 
reputation) is also higher in the full model suggesting that boards may find "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation to be more salient than do good stakeholder management 
reputation in arriving at their causal attributions.   
To test Hypothesis 4a and 4b, I created dummy variables for 4 configurations (High "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation & Low "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation; High "do good" stakeholder management reputation & High "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation, Low "do good" stakeholder management reputation & High "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation and Low "do good" stakeholder management reputation & 
Low "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation). I tested the direct effects of these 
configurations expecting to find that CEOs whose firms exhibit high levels of both "do good" 
stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation would be least 
likely to be dismissed. The coefficient for the configurational dummy variable is positive but not 
statistically significant (b=0.398, p=n.s). Thus Hypothesis 4a is not supported. To test the 
moderating effect of stakeholder management reputation configurations, I interact the dummy 
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variables with firm performance (Table 6). I find that the coefficient for the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant for the interaction term- Low "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation & High "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation (b=1.031, 
p<0.05, b=0.493, p<0.01, b=1.048, p<0.05). I also conducted additional analysis by computing the 
marginal effects of firm performance (Table 7) at the four different configurations and find, as 
expected, that the impact of firm performance on probability of CEO dismissal is lowest when 
firms display high levels of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation and low levels of 
"do good" stakeholder management reputation thus corroborating Hypothesis 4b.  
In summary, the empirical results suggest the value in examining separately the reputations 
for both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation. The empirical results are consistent with the study’s theory that different attributional 
processes may be at work. Specifically, the results suggest that boards may attach greater salience 
to arrive at causal attributions of firm performance from "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation over "do good" stakeholder management reputation. The empirical tests of the 
configurations also suggest that CEOs whose organizations have strong "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation and relatively lower levels of "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation are least likely to get dismissed.  
DISCUSSION 
This study examined the consequences of an organization’s reputation for stakeholder 
management on the likelihood of CEO dismissal. I hypothesized that "do good" stakeholder 
management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation would influence CEO 
dismissal through two conduits. First, stakeholder management reputation would reduce the 
likelihood of dismissal by positively influencing CEO efficacy attributions. Second, stakeholder 
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management reputation would also reduce the likelihood of CEO dismissal by reducing the 
likelihood of internal causal attributions from firm performance. While I did not find any support 
for the direct effects of stakeholder management reputation as well as the moderating effect of "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation, the empirical results suggest that "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation weakens the effect of firm performance on CEO dismissal. 
Furthermore, the results also suggest that CEOs of firms exhibiting low levels of "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation and high levels of "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation are significantly less likely to be dismissed at low levels of firm performance.      
The current study contributes to the call to understand better the contextual factors 
surrounding CEO dismissals (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). CEOs are increasingly expected to 
go beyond legal and regulatory compliance and so face considerable scrutiny in their management 
of stakeholders. But what are the costs of doing so for their own survival? This study suggests that 
despite these expectations, “do good" stakeholder management reputation may in fact be 
detrimental to the CEO’s survival. The results of the study suggest that it is "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation that may be more relevant to CEO survival especially when 
board members are attempting to make sense about organizational performance. Anecdotal 
evidence provides some support for this study’s findings regarding the negative effects of "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation and the positive effects of "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation. For example, after complaints from shareholders and activist investors 
PepsiCo’s “Performance with Purpose” initiatives were scaled down (Colvin, 2012). Attention 
shifted towards ensuring regulatory compliance in light of increasingly stringent regulations by 
the FDA (PepsiCo, 2014). Seen in light of poor firm performance it is easy to see why negative 
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causal attributions may easily follow "do good" stakeholder management reputation and how they 
may be weakened by relatively high levels of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. 
 Another contribution of the study is that by highlighting the differences between "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation, this 
study provides additional theoretical nuance to extant work. Traditionally, the dominant focus has 
been on "do good" stakeholder management reputation i.e., going beyond “avoiding harm.” 
Furthermore, a large body of impressive work has conceptualized stakeholder management 
reputation as a continuous variable (which is the net of positive and negative spillovers). Any point 
on this continuum is the difference between reputation for doing good and the reputation for doing 
harm. The theory developed in this study is based on the premise that "do good" stakeholder 
management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputations are theoretically distinct not 
only because of the differences in the end goal (create positive spillovers and reduce negative 
spillover respectively) but because of the differences in the strategic means through which "do 
good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputations may be 
achieved. Given the substantive results for avoid harm stakeholder management reputation, the 
findings of the study suggest that scholars may be able to develop new theoretical insights by 
examining "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation separately.  
 Another implication of this study is that a theory of the consequences of stakeholder 
management reputation should be salient to the nature of the audience. Although scholars have 
explored this question of whether it is better to “do good or avoid harm” (Crilly et al., 2016; Yoon 
et al., 2006b) and argued that avoiding harm may be seen as less authentic from the perspective 
of secondary stakeholders, the empirical results of this study suggest that for one group of primary 
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stakeholders (i.e., boards), "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be salient in 
making causal attributions of firm performance. While this may be a natural consequence of board 
members’ ability to differentiate between "do good" and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation, it nevertheless suggests that these differences are being accounted for in causal 
attributions that may lead to dismissal decisions.  
This study’s research also has some limitations. First, in the use of the KLD scores as 
evidence for a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management, the measure is a reputational assessment of only one set of actors (trained analysts) 
employed by the rating firm MSCI. Additionally, while I adopt a perspective that CEOs indeed 
shape stakeholder reputation and therefore these reputations are used to make assessments of 
efficacy and causal attributions, the question remains open as to how much the CEO influences 
stakeholder management reputation. Finally, endogeneity concerns are still likely to persist. For 
example, the decision to either create positive spillovers or reduce negative spillovers related to 
stakeholder management may be driven by institutional factors beyond the CEO/s control. To 
conclude, this study explained the mechanisms by which stakeholder management reputation may 
affect CEO dismissal in a more nuanced way by distinguishing between "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation.  The results suggest 
that scholars may do well to distinguish between the two reputations. Future scholarship may build 
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STUDY 2: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT REPUTATION AND CEO 
COMPENSATION - MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS WITH FIRM 
PERFORMANCE, BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND UNCERTAINTY 
This study examines the relationship between an organization’s reputation for stakeholder 
management and CEO compensation. A monolithic perspective on stakeholder management 
dominates extant research. In contrast, this study theorizes that organizations develop distinct 
reputations for “doing good” and “avoiding harm.” The current study finds that a reputation for 
“do good” stakeholder management is positively associated with CEO compensation while a 
reputation for “avoid harm” stakeholder management is negatively associated with CEO 
compensation for a sample of S&P-500 companies over a 9-year period. The study also explains 
and finds partial support for the role of financial performance, board independence, and 
information uncertainty as moderators of the relationship between stakeholder management 
reputation and CEO compensation. This study contributes to both the compensation and 
stakeholder management literatures by providing a more nuanced view of the relationship between 
stakeholder management and executive compensation.     
 CEO compensation has long generated considerable interest amongst scholars. When 
boards make compensation decisions, ideally, high ability managers should be rewarded with 
higher pay. In reality, CEO ability is an inherently difficult construct to assess. It is not surprising 
then that substantial scholarship on executive compensation has been influenced by classical 
economic theories and has generally found that objective indicators such as organizational size or 
firm performance strongly determine CEO compensation. However, these measures still provide 
noisy indicators at best of CEO ability (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is substantiated by research 
providing either inconsistent findings or lower effect sizes on the sensitivity of CEO compensation 
to firm performance and organizational size respectively (e.g., (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006); Lambert, 
Larcker, and Weigelt (1991)). Understandably, management scholarship has moved towards 
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examining the influence of other variables that evaluators may rely on to assess CEO ability (Harris 
& Helfat, 1997; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996).  
 In this effort to look at factors that may influence CEO compensation via assessments of 
CEO ability, one area that warrants further attention is how the firm’s engagement with a broader 
array of stakeholders affects compensation decisions. There has been growing interest from 
scholars to understand how firms undertake and deploy stakeholder management strategies as they 
seek to assess and respond to the needs of multiple stakeholders to the firm (Bundy, Shropshire, 
& Buchholtz, 2013; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014; Tantalo & Priem, 2016). Yet, little work 
has explicitly connected stakeholder management with compensation outcomes for CEOs. 
Research that has explored this link has found that stakeholder management is generally not 
rewarded in the form of increased remuneration for executives (Coombs & Gilley, 2005).  
In the current study, I investigate this relationship in a nuanced way by adopting a 
somewhat different conceptualization of stakeholder management. Specifically, I conceptualize 
stakeholder management as a reputational indicator comprised of both the reputation for “doing 
good” and the reputation for “avoiding harm.”  An organization is “doing good” when its strategic 
actions intended to create positive spillovers lead to outcomes that enhance stakeholder welfare or 
are perceived to do so. An organization is “avoiding harm” when its strategic actions intended to 
reduce negative spillovers lead to outcomes that reduce harm to stakeholders or are perceived to 
do so. Over time, these perceptions aggregate into reputations for “doing good” and “avoiding 
harm” respectively (Crilly et al., 2016; Minor & Morgan, 2011).  
CEO’s play a central role in setting the strategic direction for their organization’s 
relationships with stakeholders (Aguinis & Glavas, 2019). Moreover, it is well established that 
evaluators frequently attribute well-publicized organizational outcomes to leaders (Meindl & 
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Ehrlich, 1987) including outcomes such as stakeholder management reputation. Based on these 
insights, I propose that stakeholder management reputation will inform attributions relevant to 
CEO ability, which will in turn inform CEO compensation. Specifically, I propose and find 
evidence to support the idea that a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management will exhibit 
a stronger positive relationship to CEO compensation than a reputation for "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management. Consistent with scholarship that has demonstrated their relevance to 
CEO compensation (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013; Tosi, Werner, 
Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000), I also examine the influence of firm performance, board 
independence and uncertainty. Specifically I explain how firm performance and board 
independence may weaken the relationship between both "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation and CEO compensation. I 
suggest that uncertainty may weaken the difference between the two reputations in affecting CEO 
compensation. By fleshing out the theoretical differences between “do good” and “avoid harm” 
stakeholder management reputation and finding empirical support for their distinct effects on CEO 
compensation, this study provides additional theoretical nuance and extends previous work 
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Coombs & Gilley, 2005).  
This study has theoretical implications for the literature on CEO compensation and 
stakeholder management. Concerning the literature on CEO compensation, this study highlights 
the need to look beyond objective indicators of performance such as financial performance and 
organization size and consider the implications of strategic relationships with non–shareholder 
actors as an important determinant of CEO compensation. In regard to the stakeholder 
management literature, the study suggests the merits of independently assessing a firm’s reputation 
for “do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management. In doing so, this study builds on 
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previous work (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Coombs & Gilley, 2005) while retaining key 
differences. While previous work in this line of research has conceptualized stakeholder 
management monolithically (Coombs & Gilley, 2005; Deckop et al., 2006), recent research 
suggests that audience sensemaking processes differ when interpreting these two reputations (Sen 
& Bhattacharya, 2001). I apply this theoretical insight in this study to explain how attributions of 
CEO ability may vary depending on the type of stakeholder management reputation. Thus, this 
study adopts a cognitive rather than a purely resource based perspective in explaining the influence 
of stakeholder management reputation on CEO compensation. Overall, the findings of this study 
suggest that the relationship between stakeholder management and CEO compensation is 
somewhat more complex than previously suggested. This complexity is partially driven by how 
audiences perceive the two types of stakeholder management reputation when making assessments 
of CEO ability. Further, the study also suggests that the extent to which CEO ability attributions 
are driven by stakeholder management reputations may also depend on several contextual factors.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
Given evaluators’ limited access to information, assessing CEO ability is a challenging 
task. Consistent with theories of sensemaking and attribution (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), evaluators frequently attempt to generate attributional explanations using 
signals that are both relevant and highly accessible. While firm performance and organizational 
size are obvious factors that evaluators turn to, research also suggests that evaluators turn to other 
signals such as level of diversification and the CEO’s status as an outsider or insider (Harris & 
Helfat, 1997; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996) in assessing ability. 
 Stakeholder management reputation appears to be another factor that meets these criteria 
of relevance and accessibility for at least two reasons. First, scholarship suggests that CEOs play 
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a central role in setting the strategic direction for an organization’s engagement with its 
stakeholders (Aguinis & Glavas, 2019; Schmit et al., 2012). Indeed some research even suggests 
that CEOs may have more of a direct influence than previously understood (Davidson, Dey, & 
Smith, 2019; Ormiston & Wong, 2013; Petrenko et al., 2016; Waldman, Siegel, & Javidan, 2006). 
Furthermore, even while the extent of the CEOs involvement in setting and directing stakeholder 
management strategy may vary based on factors such as industry and CEO personality, research 
suggests that evaluators frequently ascribe organizational level reputations to CEOs (Meindl et al., 
1985).  Based on its perceived reliability, stakeholder management reputation is likely to be 
considered a pertinent signal in assessing dispositional qualities relevant to CEO compensation 
decisions.  
Second, stakeholder management reputations are highly accessible to evaluators. While 
organizations themselves have become more proactive in reporting stakeholder management 
activities, a large number of third party agencies have emerged that publish ratings/rankings of an 
organization’s stakeholder management reputation (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Rindova, Martins, 
Srinivas, & Chandler, 2018). Research suggests that these reputational indicators serve as pertinent 
sources of information for evaluators in assessing organizations.(Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 
2009). Given their high level of accessibility, stakeholder reputations are likely to be seen as a 
pertinent source of information that evaluators may use to assess CEO ability.     
 Before explicating the mechanisms connecting stakeholder management reputation to CEO 
compensation, a brief explanation of “do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management 
reputation is in order. Organizations develop "do good" stakeholder management reputation when 
strategic actions with stakeholders are perceived to lead to or increase positive spillovers (Crilly 
et al., 2016). This may be achieved directly by proactively devising solutions that enhance 
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stakeholder relationships. As such, direct solutions require substantial investments in 
organizational resources and capabilities even while linkages to shareholder value maximization 
are often uncertain at the time these investments are made (Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010) . 
Organizations may also adopt an indirect path to achieving "do good" stakeholder management 
reputations through accreditations and external certifications (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007; Stahl 
& De Luque, 2014). Organizations gain “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputations when 
strategic actions with stakeholders are perceived to reduce or eliminate negative spillovers (Crilly 
et al., 2016). This may be achieved by abstaining from controversial business practices, addressing 
reputational losses and reducing risks and liabilities (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez–Mejia, 
2012).  As such "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by ensuring 
compliance with the law so that visible manifestations of managerial or organizational 
irresponsibility are minimized (Minor & Morgan, 2011).  
Stakeholder management reputations and CEO attributions 
I have thus far focused on why stakeholder management reputation may be considered a 
pertinent factor in assessments of CEO ability. This section describes in more detail the features 
that evaluators may be seeking in assessing attributions of ability relevant to compensation 
decisions. Shareholders generally reward initiative taking and prefer it to risk aversion with regards 
to CEO compensation (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). I propose that "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation signals initiative taking. For example, consider PepsiCo’s initiative from 
2007 that was widely known as “Performance with a Purpose” (PepsiCo, 2017). The strategic 
initiative was championed by PepsiCo’s CEO with the purpose of attaining a leadership position 
in organizational sustainability. PepsiCo increased capital investments in new R&D laboratories 
and expanded innovation capabilities, particularly through hiring of senior managers (Chatterji, 
   
 
 56 
2013, August; Seabrook, 2011). Audiences are likely to perceive these strategic actions as 
discretionary, voluntary and aimed at generating positive spillovers (Morrison & Phelps, 1999). In 
general "do good" stakeholder management reputation should lead to attributions of CEO ability 
to initiate change. “Avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation is preceded by strategic 
actions aimed at reducing negative spillovers. An “avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation is important for safeguarding the firm from negative publicity (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). However it is plausible that it may also be perceived as a signal of the CEO’s risk aversion. 
Managers are generally viewed as risk averse (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and one of the core ideas 
of agency theory is that risk aversion will entail lower levels of compensation (Fama, 1980). Given 
that CEOs time and effort are bounded (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), and that risk aversion has 
been found to have a negative bearing on wealth creation (DeFusco, Johnson, & Zorn, 1990), 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be perceived as a suboptimal or overly 
conservative resource allocation in regards to shareholder value maximization. To the extent that 
risk preferences are displayed through stakeholder management reputation and to the extent that 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation necessitates partial adherence to status quo, high 
levels of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be perceived as managerial 
inability to cope with organizational change (Judge, Thoresen, Pucik, & Welbourne, 1999). Given 
these insights I propose that in general, while both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management reputation should lead to positive ascriptions of CEO ability, 
excessive levels of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be attributed to CEO 
risk aversion.  
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Stakeholder management and CEO compensation 
 To the extent that "do good" stakeholder management reputation is associated with creating 
positive spillovers, the strategic behaviors associated with "do good" stakeholder management 
reputation as exemplified by organizations such as PepsiCo and Unilever (Abboud, 2018, 
November 29; Colvin, 2012) demand a reconfiguring of skills and resources for the organization. 
Such reconfigurations may in turn lead to competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). Several other 
strategic choices associated with "do good" stakeholder management reputation also have been 
shown to lead to positive spillovers (e.g., increased stock returns through selling to marginalized 
communities (Mishra & Modi, 2016)) and productivity increases from gain sharing plans (Bullock 
& Tubbs, 1990)). These organizational level spillovers are also known to improve employee 
commitment and retention. A number of empirical studies provide evidence in support of this 
argument: organizations are able to attract higher quality employees and decrease turnover 
(Albinger & Freeman, 2000) when they have a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management. 
 “Do good" stakeholder management reputation also has important implications for media 
coverage and corporate reputation (Fombrun, 2005). Scholarship suggests that "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation leads to more favorable media coverage (Cahan et al., 2015) 
as well as increased favorability amongst important information intermediaries such as security 
analysts (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015). In line with these arguments, "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation has strong linkages to several positive spillovers. To the extent that 
evaluators not only perceive CEOs as highly influential but also make strong attributions of 
organizational level outcomes to CEOs (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987), "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation should lead to positive attributions of initiative taking. These arguments 
   
 
 58 
are also closely supported by research, demonstrating that CEOs are a major feature of strong 
organizational-stakeholder relationships (Intintoli, Serfling, & Shaikh, 2017). 
 Strategic actions associated with "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation suggest 
a compliance focus with the objective of reducing risks related to stakeholders. Reputation for 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management is less likely to be associated with extra role behaviors that 
are characterized by a change orientation and voluntary actions (Morrison & Phelps, 1999). While 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may potentially lead to positive spillovers in 
terms of reduced cost of capital (Kölbel et al., 2017), the relationship between risk reduction and 
shareholder value, a core criteria for CEO compensation,  has been called into question (DeFusco 
et al., 1990; Tufano, 1996). Albeit in some situations, "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation may be valuable to make efficacy assessments. For example, when firm performance is 
poor, risk management may take precedence over shareholder value maximization and the board 
may see "avoid harm" stakeholder management as pertinent towards decisions to retain or dismiss 
a CEO. However, in regards to CEO compensation, shareholders prefer to reward CEOs when 
organizational strategies positively influence shareholder value (Kerr & Bettis, 1987), it may be 
expected that "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be seen as less pertinent to 
making ability attributions relevant to CEO compensation. Finally, from a risk-return tradeoff 
perspective, "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may be seen as taking valuable time 
and effort away from sustaining or creating  "do good" stakeholder management reputation that is 
perceived to have greater impact on financial performance (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). 
Attributions of risk aversion may be more pronounced when CEOs of peer firms in the same 
industry display lower levels of reputation for "avoid harm" stakeholder management.  Note that 
the theory advanced here does not require organizations to have one dominant reputation. Previous 
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work has found evidence to support an overall negative relationship between stakeholder 
management and CEO compensation (Coombs & Gilley, 2005). This is perhaps a consequence of 
combining both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputations to arrive at an overall measure. I expect that while both "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may lead to positive 
attributions of ability, "do good" stakeholder management reputation will be seen as more pertinent 
to attributions of CEO ability.  
For the above reasons, I hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 1: "Do good" stakeholder management reputation has a more positive 
effect on CEO compensation than "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation. 
Moderating role of firm performance  
 Several studies have demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1988; Mehran, 1995). Naturally this raises the question of how firm performance 
affects the relationship between stakeholder management reputation and CEO compensation. 
 Under a shareholder logic, firm financial performance retains dominant priority for 
important stakeholders such as boards and institutional investors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). To 
reduce agency conflicts, a major portion of the CEO’s compensation is linked to firm performance 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010).  Given the 
dominance of the shareholder value logic especially in the context of the United States (Ocasio & 
Radoynovska, 2016), board reputation may even depend on the degree to which CEO’s are 
compensated for increasing the level of firm performance (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Additionally, 
given the relatively objective nature of market measures of firm performance (Baysinger & 
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Hoskisson, 1990), it may even be easier to justify their use in compensation decisions. Further, 
there is evidence to suggest that adherence to shareholder welfare may result in boards 
compensating for firm performance without sufficiently establishing causal linkages between CEO 
ability and firm performance (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). This is consistent with research 
suggesting that in general, evaluators exhibit strong tendencies to over-attribute firm performance 
to CEOs especially when firm performance is high (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). As firm performance 
increases, such causal attributions may even get stronger. In other words, I suggest that as firm 
performance improves, it may crowd out other sources of information pertinent to positive CEO 
ability attributions.  
It is also perhaps noteworthy that the lack of a consistent relationship between stakeholder 
management and financial performance (Zhao & Murrell, 2016) may also lead evaluators to attach 
less salience to second order expectations (i.e. stakeholder management) and instead focus on first 
order expectations (i.e. financial performance) in making attributions of CEO ability. Therefore, 
when firm financial performance improves, evaluators should feel the need to compensate the CEO 
for financial performance and reduce sensitivity of pay to CEO ability attributions from 
stakeholder management reputation.  
I set forth the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of stakeholder management reputation on CEO 
compensation is weakened as firm performance improves. 
 
Moderating role of board independence 
 I next consider the role of board independence as a contextual feature that may influence 
decisions related to CEO compensation. Governance structures are an important determinant of 
compensation arrangements and central amongst these is board independence (Conyon & Peck, 
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1998). It may be expected that independent board members do not have access to information in a 
way that insider board members have access to. As a result, they are more likely to rely on 
relatively more objective indicators of firm performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). This 
reliance may in turn increase the sensitivity of firm performance to CEO compensation (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). 
 Moreover, independent directors are expected to hold higher levels of fiduciary 
responsibility towards shareholders than insider directors (Blair & Stout, 2001). Given this 
responsibility, it may be expected that independent directors will perceive market based measures 
of performance as more important than other indicators of CEO ability.  Consequently, subjective 
measures of effectiveness such as stakeholder management reputation may be seen as less relevant 
to an independent board (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  
There are other considerations. CEOs may deliberately allocate resources towards 
increasing "do good" stakeholder management reputation to serve personal needs and enhance 
their own social and reputational capital at the expense of their organizations (Petrenko et al., 
2016). Scholarship also suggests that a reputation for "do good" stakeholder management may 
serve as a mechanism by which CEOs strengthen their relationships with important stakeholders 
and thereby entrench themselves (Surroca & Tribó, 2008). With reference to "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation, compliance driven strategies (i.e. "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation) may be viewed with suspicion by evaluators (Yoon et al., 2006b). A 
further point worth noting is that outsider boards are paradoxically known to favor measures to 
curtail risk aversion (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Consistent with this argument, independent 
boards may find avoid harm stakeholder management reputation to be less relevant in making 
positive attributions of CEO ability. I combine these insights with research suggesting that out-
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group members are less likely to arrive at positive attributions compared to in-group members 
(Hewstone, 1990). Given their status as out-group members with limited information relative to 
insider directors, independent directors should be less likely to arrive at positive attributions of 
CEO ability from stakeholder management reputation. Accordingly I expect that as board 
independence increases, the positive impact of stakeholder management reputation on CEO 
compensation should be weaker.  
Hypothesis 3: The impact of stakeholder management reputation (both do good 
and avoid harm) on CEO compensation is weakened as board independence 
increases. 
Role of uncertainty 
 A final contextual variable this study considers is firm level uncertainty. The construct of 
uncertainty is defined here as the difficulty of understanding and interpreting organizational 
strategies and their linkages to firm performance. As uncertainty increases, evaluators’ may face 
heightened search costs related to CEO ability. Under conditions of uncertainty, the CEO’s 
contribution towards both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation may be more difficult to assess. Consequently, there is an increased 
likelihood of discrepancy between actual ability and perceived ability (Lynn, Podolny, & Tao, 
2009). To the extent that stakeholder management reputation may be considered as relatively a 
less objective source of information especially when uncertainty is high, evaluators may increase 
their reliance on sources of information that are easier to interpret. 
This is because uncertainty may increase the likelihood of the CEO shirking responsibility 
towards stakeholders or convincing the board that they have expertise in managing stakeholders 
even when they do not (Eisenhardt, 1989). Uncertainty may also influence the likelihood that CEO 
personal preferences rather than organizational needs may determine both the direction and 
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magnitude of stakeholder management reputation (Jensen, 2010). Further, uncertainty may also 
increase information processing demands for the board (Daft, Lengel, & Treviño, 1987) thereby 
making it more likely for the board to rely on outcome based indicators (Eisenhardt, 1989). For 
instance, consider the case of a CEO of an organization that has taken a leadership role in water 
conservation efforts. She has increased investments in human capital and R&D capabilities leading 
evaluators to ascribe a high level of "do good" stakeholder management reputation to the 
organization. However, high levels of uncertainty may mean that evaluators are unaware of the 
extent to which the CEO has taken a lead role in this endeavor or the extent to which the resulting 
increase in reputation for “do good” may be linked to increased financial returns. Similarly, 
evaluators may be less likely to understand the limited benefits of "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation (e.g. to reduce cost of capital (Chava, 2014)) and more likely to make 
attributions of risk aversion as uncertainty increases. These arguments are consistent with research 
suggesting that as uncertainty increases, evaluators are less likely to rely on additional sources of 
information (i.e., stakeholder management reputation) to make attributional references (Edwards, 
1998).    
Hypothesis 4: The positive impact of both "do good" stakeholder management 





DATA AND METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
 I included all companies in the S&P-500 on the 1st of January 2006 and tracked them from 
2006-2014. Firm performance data were constructed using financial information drawn from 
Compustat. CEO related information was obtained from ExecuComp. Data for governance 
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variables including board size and board independence were obtained from BoardEx. After 
accounting for missing information, the final sample consisted of 2824 firm-year observations.  
Dependent Variable 
CEO compensation 
 Total CEO compensation, consisting of salary, bonus, and long-term compensation is the 
primary dependent variable. As the distribution of the total compensation was skewed, I applied a 
logarithmic transformation which is consistent with prior research (Chava, 2014).  
Independent variable 
“Do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management reputation 
 The study uses the KLD database to construct proxies for stakeholder management 
reputation. KLD data are assembled from a wide variety of sources such as SEC filings, AGM 
meetings, news reports and government and NGO databases. KLD data cover the following 
stakeholders: employees, consumers, shareholders, communities and environment. For each of the 
stakeholders, KLD assesses several indicators. These indicators may either be strength indicators 
or concern indicators. An organization is assigned a score of 1 if it meets the assessment criteria 
and a score of 0 if it does not meet the assessment criteria for each indicator. There are more than 
65 strength and concern indicators.  
This study uses the strength and concern scores as proxies for "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation respectively. The 
assessment of an indicator is a subjective decision made by trained analysts using publicly 
available sources. As such, KLD scores are closer approximations of perceptions of strategic 
actions rather than actual outcomes themselves (Hart & Sharfman, 2015; Mattingly & Berman, 
2006). Using KLD strengths and concerns as proxies for "do good" stakeholder management 
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reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation helps retain consistency between 
the theoretical variables and their operationalization. Additionally this practice of assessing the 
strengths and concerns separately helps retain empirical distinction as well. While several studies 
combine the strengths and concerns, the absence of a strength cannot be assessed as the presence 
of a concern or vice versa (Hart & Sharfman, 2015; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). For example, a 
company’s reputation for investments in carbon efficient technologies may not compensate for its 
poor reputation in adherence to existing environmental guidelines. 
 I reverse code the concerns score for ease of understanding, and to suggest that the 
company has developed a reputation for avoiding concerns and controversies. Consistent with 
previous work (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Sharfman, 1996), I combine the component scores for 
strengths to arrive at an overall score for “do good” and combine the concerns component scores 
to achieve the overall “avoid harm” measure. The final scores for “do good” and “avoid harm” 
stakeholder management are standardized using 2 digits SIC codes. 
Moderator Variables 
Firm Performance 
To the extent that a major responsibility of the board is to represent the interests of 
shareholders (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), boards may be highly sensitive to measures such as 
total shareholder return (TSR) that partially capture the extent to which shareholders gain from 
their investments in the firm. I operationalize TSR as the ratio of the annual change in stock price 
plus dividends divided by the opening price of the stock adjusted for industry effects (Flickinger 








I measure board independence as the ratio of number of independent unaffiliated directors 
to the total number of directors. The mean board independence is 0.876.  
Uncertainty 
I operationalize firm level uncertainty using accuracy of analyst forecasts. As important 
information intermediaries, analysts are expected to accurately predict the firm’s future earnings 
(Beunza & Garud, 2007). The accuracy of these predictions is likely to improve when the 
organization and its managers disseminate pertinent information leading to lower levels of 
uncertainty. Accuracy improves as uncertainty decreases (Hope, 2003). I arrived at this measure 
by calculating the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and the earnings 
estimate and dividing it by the earnings estimate. Consistent with O'Brien and Bhushan (1990), 
Clement (1999), and Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999), I use the last estimate provided by the 
analyst for each quarter because it is likely to incorporate the most complete information available 
to the analyst prior to making the final estimate for the quarter. Since our interest is in the degree 
to which the actual earnings per share match the estimate, I used the estimate rather than the actual 
earnings as the denominator. I constructed a single measure of accuracy for every firm year by 
averaging the accuracy values across all analysts. I then normalized the measure by dividing it 
with by the stock price at the end of the calendar year prior to the announcement of the rankings 
consistent with the measure adopted in past research (Butler & Lang, 1991). Since a lower value 
indicates greater accuracy I reversed the sign of the item and expect a positive coefficient for 
accuracy as per the hypothesis. The mean value for uncertainty is 0.016. 
Control variables 
 The study incorporates several control variables in the analysis. Boards may be sensitive 
to accounting measures of firm performance in addition to market measures (Fich & Shivdasani, 
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2006) so return on assets (ROA) is employed as a control variable. This measure was arrived at 
by dividing the net income by the value of the total assets and adjusted for industry differences. 
Board size is also controlled for because (a) it may influence decision-making capability of the 
board (Yermack, 1996) and  (b) because larger boards may be more easily captured by the CEO 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Consequently, board size may influence board monitoring, which may 
influence the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting 
and market performance. I also control for CEO age because age may inform the type of 
compensation that CEOs may prefer. For example, CEOs who are older and closer to retirement 
may prefer increments to salary and total compensation that exhibits reduced sensitivity to market 
and accounting performance while younger CEOs may be more accepting of riskier compensation 
arrangements (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). I control for CEO tenure because tenure may 
influence the CEO’s ability to exert influence on the board and shareholders. CEOs who have 
served in their roles for longer are likely to have amassed higher levels of social and reputational 
capital, which may strongly influence magnitude, and sensitivity of compensation (Hill & Phan, 
1991). I control for CEO duality. CEO duality may inform compensation because combining the 
role of the CEO and Chairperson means that information processing demands may increase (Boyd, 
1995) which may be positively related to compensation. Additionally, CEO duality may also be 
associated with CEO power and the ability of the CEO to exert greater personal preferences in the 
compensation structure (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). I operationalize CEO duality as ‘1’ if the CEO 
is also Chairperson and ‘0’ otherwise. I also control for CEO ownership. Research suggests that 
magnitude of compensation may be determined by the CEO’s shareholding in the firm (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1989). Additionally, the CEOs own shareholding may affect the distribution of their 
attention towards “do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management and consequently inform 
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stakeholder management reputation. Following Jenter and Kanaan (2015), I operationalize CEO 
ownership as high or low ownership based on ownership greater than or equal to 5% and less than 
5% respectively. The final control variable is firm size. A number of studies suggest that firm size 
explains a large variance in CEO compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Tosi et al., 2000). 
I operationalize firm size by taking the log of sales.  
Analysis 
 Stakeholder management reputation may be dependent on firm financial performance and 
organization size (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). A major concern then with using a stakeholder 
management reputation measure as an independent variable is the potential endogeneity between 
stakeholder management reputation and other factors that may also influence CEO compensation. 
So it is important to identify whether or not a reputation for stakeholder management that is 
independent of firm financial performance and size has an effect on CEO compensation. To 
address this potential concern, I regress “do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management 
reputation on financial performance and size and use the residuals in the second stage regressions 
predicting CEO compensation. The model estimates the value of reputation for “do good” and 
“avoid harm” stakeholder management based on multiple measures of firm financial performance 
(return on assets, total shareholder return and adjusted market to book ratio), firm size 
(operationalized by taking the logarithm of sales) and year dummies. I use the residuals from these 
models as proxies for the measures of “do good” and “avoid harm” stakeholder management 
reputation. This approach minimizes potential endogeneity between the stakeholder management 
and financial performance. Table 8 reports the statistical tables and correlations. The values for 
"do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation are 
those of the regression residuals from which the performance and organizational size components 
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have been removed. The VIF score was 1.19, which partially alleviates concerns regarding 
multicollinearity. 
RESULTS  
I report analysis based on the generalized least squares cross sectional time series 
regressions. GLS models are appropriate for this study’s analysis because they allow control of 
the unequal variability in the dependent variable (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). Additionally, GLS 
models also allow controlling for autocorrelation (Windal & Weiss, 1980). GLS models are 
especially appropriate for analyzing dependent variables such as CEO compensation. For example, 
given that this study’s measure of compensation is total CEO compensation, there may be large 
variations in compensation based on the organization’s size and financial performance. Similarly, 
CEO compensation may also be informed by variables that may be accounted for in the error terms, 
which may exhibit a trend over time i.e., they may be autocorrelated. GLS models are particularly 
suited to such settings subject to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
 Table 9 displays the results of these regressions. Hypothesis 1 (Model 1) predicted that 
relative to "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation, “do good” stakeholder management 
reputation would be more positively related to CEO compensation. I find that the coefficient of 
“do good” stakeholder management reputation is positive and significant (𝛽𝛽= 0.001, p<0.001). 
The coefficient of avoid harm stakeholder management reputation is negative and significant (𝛽𝛽= 
-0.001, p<0.01) suggesting that "do good" stakeholder management reputation may have a stronger 
positive effect on CEO compensation relative to "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation.  
 To test the moderating effect of firm performance, I created the interaction terms Firm 
performance * "Do good" stakeholder management reputation and Firm performance * "Avoid 
harm" stakeholder management reputation (Models 2&3). I find the moderating effects for the 
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first interaction term to be negative and significant suggesting that firm performance weakens the 
effect of “do good” stakeholder management reputation on CEO compensation (𝛽𝛽= -0.000, 
p<0.01). Hypothesis 2 also predicted that firm performance weakens the effect of the reputation 
for avoid harm stakeholder management on CEO compensation. The coefficient for the interaction 
term Firm performance * "Avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation is negative but not 
significant (𝛽𝛽= -0.000, ns). This suggests that firm performance has no effect on the informational 
value of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation on CEO compensation. These results 
suggest partial support for hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 (Models 4 & 5), predicted that board independence weakens the effect of 
stakeholder management reputation on CEO compensation. I created the interaction terms Board 
independence * “Do good” stakeholder management reputation and Board independence * 
"Avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. I find that the coefficient for Board 
independence * "Do good" stakeholder management reputation is negative but not significant 
  (𝛽𝛽= -0.000, ns) suggesting that board independence has no effect on the pertinence of "do good" 
stakeholder management reputation. However, I find that the interaction term Board independence 
* "Avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation is negative and significant (𝛽𝛽= -0.004, 
p<0.001) suggesting that the effect of "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation becomes 
less salient as board independence increases. These empirical results suggest partial support for 
hypothesis 3. 
  To test the moderating effect of uncertainty, I created the interaction term Uncertainty * 
"Do good" stakeholder management reputation and Uncertainty * "Avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation (Models 6 & 7). I predicted that uncertainty would reduce the salience of 
both "do good" stakeholder management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
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reputation on CEO compensation. That is uncertainty would reduce the likelihood that CEO’s 
would be compensated for stakeholder management reputation. I find that the interaction term 
Uncertainty *"Do good" stakeholder management reputation is negative and significant (𝛽𝛽=-
0.001, p<0.1). I also find the interaction term Uncertainty*"Avoid harm" stakeholder management 
is negative and significant (𝛽𝛽=-0.001, p<0.05). These results suggest that as uncertainty increases, 
stakeholder management reputation is less likely to be pertinent towards positive attributions of 
CEO ability. These results corroborate hypothesis 4.   
Addressing concerns of reverse causality  
 Of particular concern in compensation studies is the problem of reverse causality. 
Specifically, it is possible that that the CEO’s allocation of effort towards stakeholder management 
reputation may depend on their compensation. So basic Granger causality tests were conducted 
(Xueming, Heli, Raithel, & Qinqin, 2015). The null hypotheses are that compensation does not 
predict both “do good” stakeholder management reputation and “avoid harm” stakeholder 
management reputation. The Wald statistics suggest (compensation ---> “do good” stakeholder 
management reputation (p>0.05) and compensation ---> "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation (p>0.05)) that the hypotheses are not rejected, alleviating concerns about reverse 
causality.  
DISCUSSION 
 The focus of this study was to explain how "do good" stakeholder management reputation 
and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation influence CEO compensation. The 
empirical results provide support for this study’s baseline hypothesis that "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation bears a stronger positive relationship with CEO compensation relative to 
"avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. Interestingly, the empirical results also suggest 
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that "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation may in fact be detrimental to CEO 
compensation. The study also explored the role of contextual factors that may influence the 
relationship between stakeholder management reputation and CEO compensation. These include 
firm performance, board independence and firm level uncertainty. The study found partial support 
for the role of firm performance and board independence. Specifically, "do good" stakeholder 
management reputation becomes less pertinent towards CEO compensation as firm performance 
improves and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation becomes less pertinent towards 
CEO compensation as board independence increases. With regards to uncertainty, the empirical 
results suggest that as uncertainty increases, both "do good" stakeholder management reputation 
and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation become less salient towards CEO 
compensation.   
The study has implications for the literature on CEO compensation.  Specifically, the study 
theorizes that "do good" stakeholder management reputation may be perceived as increasing the 
CEO/firm’s overall level of effectiveness through gains in social and reputational capital. Avoid 
harm stakeholder management is likely to be seen as less pertinent for two reasons. One, because 
it bears weaker associations with taking initiative and two, because it may be perceived as a signal 
of risk aversion especially when the focal organization’s "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation is higher than those of peer organizations. The empirical analysis appears to support the 
idea that "do good" stakeholder management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation have divergent effects on CEO compensation. The finding that firm 
performance makes "do good" stakeholder management reputation less pertinent suggests that the 
shareholder logic may still hold dominance over the stakeholder view in matters related to CEO 
compensation. The expectation that board independence will negatively affect the relationship 
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between stakeholder management reputation and CEO compensation is partially supported. As 
board independence increases, the relevance of "avoid harm" stakeholder management towards 
CEO compensation appears to decrease. This is consistent with theory suggesting that outsider 
directors are less susceptible to incentivize risk aversion. Uncertainty increases information 
processing demands from evaluators (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Positive linkages between 
stakeholder management reputation, organizational effectiveness and financial performance may 
become more difficult to establish. This difficulty may lead evaluators to rely less on subjective 
measures of performance such as stakeholder management reputation to make attributions of CEO 
ability (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Consequently, pertinence of stakeholder management reputation on 
CEO compensation may decrease as uncertainty increases. The role of uncertainty also suggests 
that a key challenge managers may face in their strategic responsibilities towards stakeholders is 
clarifying the strategic actions they undertake with application to stakeholders.  
An important distinction between this study and previous work is in the conceptualization 
of stakeholder management reputation. Prior work has theorized that stakeholder management 
should exhibit a positive relationship with CEO compensation and that firm performance should 
strengthen this relationship (Coombs & Gilley, 2005). However (Coombs & Gilley, 2005) find a 
negative relationship between stakeholder management and CEO compensation and a negative 
moderating effect of firm performance.  I propose that these inconsistencies may be a consequence 
of a reductionist treatment of stakeholder management reputation that does not distinguish between 
"do good" stakeholder management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputation. While some scholars have argued in support of a non-monolithic perspective (see 
Deckop et al., 2006) and have adopted empirical strategies consistent with this this theory, recent 
work has highlighted important distinctions between the two types of stakeholder management 
   
 
 74 
reputation (Chava, 2014; Crilly et al., 2016; Minor & Morgan, 2011). This study aligns with the 
more recent perspective and reaffirms the need to distinguish between “doing good” and “avoiding 
harm.” In so doing, this study contributes additional theoretical nuance to extant work.    
 By emphasizing the conceptualization of stakeholder management reputation as consisting 
of both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management 
reputations, this study also addresses a concern that some scholars have expressed. Traditionally 
stakeholder theory has paid less attention to compliance (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) and 
instead focused on creating value for stakeholders. However, given that failure to keep in check 
the unintended consequences of stakeholder engagement may be consequential to CEOs, "avoid 
harm" stakeholder management reputation is also likely to be a key concern. In fact some CEOs 
such as Hugh Grant of Monsanto have developed a reputation for vigilance and compliance over 
a more proactive approach (Monsanto, 2014). So although conceptualizing stakeholder 
management as consisting of both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management is relatively new (Crilly et al., 2016; Minor & Morgan, 2011), the 
differential effects of the two approaches on CEO compensation further bolster the case for 
separately examining the effects of both "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" 
stakeholder management reputation.  
 The study also makes a contribution to upper echelons of research. CEOs are under 
significant pressure to address the needs of multiple stakeholders while creating their own welfare. 
Scholarship suggests that attributional processes regarding the centrality of CEOs towards their 
firms have become more significant (Quigley & Hambrick, 2015), which is reflected in increasing 
compensation as well as the increased likelihood of being dismissed for mis-management of 
stakeholders. Given that CEOs may only have limited time to allocate between stakeholder value 
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maximization and addressing stakeholder risk, the choice between allocating effort to increase "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation 
is likely to be difficult. In other words, there is likely to be a trade-off between improving "do 
good" stakeholder management reputation and "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation 
because while the former may be positively related to CEO compensation, the latter may be more 
important to reduce the likelihood of dismissal.  
 The study has several limitations. First, an organization’s reputation for "do good" 
stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder management may be dependent on 
financial performance and organizational size. This study took some steps to alleviate concerns 
related to endogeneity of stakeholder management reputation by regressing the measures for 
stakeholder management on three measures of financial performance and organization size. Recent 
research has also demonstrated that CEO’s allocation of resources towards stakeholder 
management may also be dependent on their personal preferences (Petrenko et al., 2016). 
However, I posit that while personal preferences may determine which stakeholders receive 
attention, the overall magnitude of financial investments allocated towards improving stakeholder 
management reputation may be less susceptible to personal preferences. In other words, the 
magnitude of investments may be more strongly explained by variances in financial performance 
and size-alleviating self-selection related concerns to some extent. Additionally the study also 
employs several control variables that may help address other endogeneity concerns.  
 A second limitation resides in the usage of KLD data. Although the data have been widely 
adopted in several studies (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997), there may be some concerns regarding the scoring methodology. Trained analysts 
assign scores for the strength and concern indicators based on assessment criteria that are not fully 
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objective. In other words, to some degree these measures are socially constructed and greatly 
depend on the evaluator’s subjective assessment of the organization’s ability (Hart & Sharfman, 
2015). However, given that this measure is a perceptual measure, it closely resembles the “being 
known for something” dimension of organizational reputation (Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011) . That is, 
the KLD measures may be better conceptualized as a reputational measure rather than as an 
outcome measure. To that extent the usage of KLD measures as a reputational indicator rather than 
as an indicator of organizational outcomes, alleviates concerns related to the validity of the 
measure.  
I see this study as providing impetus to the following research streams. In the area of CEO 
compensation, this study reinvigorates the idea that an organization’s stakeholder management 
reputation may influence CEO compensation. The study does this by providing a behavioral 
perspective on how evaluators may use different interpretation schemas in attributing CEO ability 
from stakeholder management reputation. Evaluator’s sensemaking processes may depend on the 
type of stakeholder management reputation. Future research may build on this study and test the 
generalizability of these findings. For instance, organizations may be impacted by scandals and 
organizational disasters. Will evaluators make similar attributions of CEO ability from stakeholder 
management reputation following these events? Future research may also examine the role of CEO 
in allocating organizational resources towards improving stakeholder management reputation.  For 
example, do CEOs make large stakeholder related investments early in their careers to enhance 
"do good" stakeholder management reputation, or only when their organizations have already 
established "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputations? Finally, future research may also 
examine the role played by the external constituents such as the media and activist investors. For 
example, PepsiCo increased advertising spending by $500 million on its biggest brands when faced 
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with backlash from investors who saw little value in PepsiCo’s investments towards innovations 
related to healthy foods (Colvin, 2013). How do these decisions influence attributions of CEO 
ability from stakeholder management reputation? Finally, it would also be interesting to look at 
other CEO and board related contextual features such as duality, managerial discretion and board 
reputation that may affect the stakeholder management reputation – CEO compensation 
relationship. Overall, the study showed that "do good" stakeholder management reputation brings 
higher positive benefits to CEOs relative to "avoid harm" stakeholder management reputation. 
Partial support for the role of firm performance and board independence once again reaffirmed the 
need to distinguish between "do good" stakeholder management and "avoid harm" stakeholder 
management reputation. An important managerial implication of this study is that uncertainty can 
weaken the spillover effects of stakeholder management reputation on CEO compensation. In 
conclusion, future researchers would do well to consider the nuances of stakeholder management 
reputation, consider the influence of other relevant moderators and expand attention beyond the 
CEO.   
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